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suggesting that “no first use” ought not
to be taken quite so literally. Wortzel
offers a counterbalance to this view,
elucidating both the concept of preemptive counterattack and the current
debate within China on the viability
and utility of adherence to “no first
use.” His conclusion on this crucial issue is that the debate within China on
“no first use” is real, that a new generation of officers, diplomats, and scholars
leans significantly toward modifying or
jettisoning such a declaratory policy. In
fact, this conclusion is quite in accord
with the one developed and briefed by
the Mahan Scholars student research
team at the Naval War College in the
spring of 2007.
Regarding nuclear command and control, Wortzel finds that the originator of
valid firing orders for the Second Artillery is the Central Military Commission
(CMC), “the highest and most centralized level of military leadership in the
Chinese Communist Party.” While we
would agree that tongshuaibu, or “supreme command,” probably refers to
the CMC in the context of nuclear release authority, this is not completely
clear, and explicit phraseology to bolster that conception was uncomfortably
dropped from defense white papers of
2004 to 2006. Furthermore, in other
writings it appears that conventionalmissile firing authority during conflict
is certainly delegated downward, to the
Second Artillery itself. Such delegation
is, of course, to be expected, but in a
conflict that involved the movement of
nuclear forces and became intense, the
concomitant risks of unauthorized or
inadvertent nuclear missile launch
would grow alarmingly.
In addition to solid scholarship regarding the question of “no first use” and
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nuclear command and control, this
monograph offers substantial original
material on missile-force readiness levels, survivability issues, and targeting.
Overall, as expected from an academician
of Wortzel’s caliber, this work expands
our understanding of the Chinese nuclear posture. As such, it demands the
attention of all China specialists and
nuclear strategists.
CHRISTOPHER YEAW

Naval War College

Sawyer, Ralph D. The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China.
New York: Basic Books, 2007. 489pp. $29.95

Ralph D. Sawyer, noted scholar of Chinese strategic thought, has produced an
enlightening study of the beginnings and
the evolution of deception in Chinese
political and military history. Contrary
to some contemporary commentators,
China has a long martial tradition.
Warrior leaders and military heroes
permeate both historic and contemporary Chinese literature, as well as modern movies. Deception has long been an
integral part of Chinese warfare. Drawing on the classic works of Chinese military thought, Sawyer demonstrates that
deceptive practices and unorthodox approaches are the norm rather than the
exception. Deception is a fundamental
tenet of Chinese strategic culture, one
that permeates strategic thinking not
only in the military realm but also in
the diplomatic, information, political,
and economic spheres. (Readers of
Sawyer’s previous work, The Tao of
Spycraft, reviewed in the Winter 2007
issue of this journal, will recall that
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Chinese states were using “all elements of
national power” several millennia ago.)
The reader can conclude from this work
that Chinese military thought places deception on an equal level with fire and
maneuver. In this it differs from Western
military thought, which fundamentally
considers deception as “unsportsmanlike” and relegates it to the operational
and intellectual fringes. Deception and
unorthodox approaches afford ways for
the inferior to defeat the superior force.
The “stronger” force, as judged by conventional military standards, is not necessarily more likely to win in battle.
Rather, the force that applies the orthodox and the unorthodox in a way that
fits the situation better is more likely to
prevail. The book abounds with examples of how a little deception or unconventional application can have a great
effect on outcomes.
The relationship between military operations and statecraft is another fundamental thread through this book.
Subversion of an enemy state begins
well before military conflict, and ideally
it makes conflict unneeded. Bribery, assassination (both physical and character), dissension, and distraction are all
basic tools of statecraft, as well as of war.
Fundamentally, Chinese thought makes
no real distinction between the two.
The final chapters address the ongoing
renaissance of traditional Chinese military thought in the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA). The once-despised classic
works are now widely used in PLA
institutions.
Several years ago, two PLA officers published a book, Unrestricted Warfare,
that describes unconventional approaches for defeating a superior force.
In light of Sawyer’s new work, Western
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scholars should reinterpret Unrestricted
Warfare. Rather than being an exception to PLA military thought, it may
well reflect current, core thinking.
Sawyer argues that “China has a lengthy
heritage of conceiving and implementing systemic programs for subverting
other states.” It would be interesting for
scholars of contemporary Chinese diplomacy to compare the “active measures” stratagems outlined in the book
against current U.S.-China events.
This book reads well. A dynastic chronology helps place the events in historical (Chinese, if not world) context.
However, maps would have greatly assisted understanding.
JOHN R. ARPIN

Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)
Centreville, Virginia

Shirk, Susan. China, Fragile Superpower: How
China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful
Rise. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007.
336pp. $27

According to Susan Shirk, China suffers
terribly from the “wag the dog” syndrome. Shirk argues rather persuasively
that China is saddled with a host of internal problems, ranging from widespread social unrest to rampant political
corruption, that have sharply intensified insecurities among Chinese leaders
with respect to their hold on power.
Such perceptions of vulnerability have
in turn heightened Chinese sensitivities
to slights by Japan, Taiwan, and the
United States, slights that accordingly
threaten to arouse potentially uncontrollable national passions and, in the
process, stimulate regime-toppling impulses at home. For Shirk, this volatile
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